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1WHEN OVERSEEING BECOMES OVERLOOKING: THE POST-GFC
RECONFIGURATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE
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Abstract: This article draws on empirical evidence suggesting a shift
of credit provision from banks to the alternative investment fund sector to
argue that current deficiencies in fund regulation have not prevented such a
shift, if not actually encouraged it. The evidence is drawn from the new Pan-
European Private Placement Market, and first- and second-order analyses
are undertaken to show a shift of credit risk (intermediation) into the hands of
US funds in particular, and a concentration of risk amongst herds of smaller
funds which have the potential to act as one. The data highlight defects in the
scope of the macroprudential oversight mechanisms deriving from the
Alternative Investment Fund Management Directive (AIFMD). These findings
form the basis for proposals to remedy AIFMD as part of the move to a Capital
Markets Union.
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2A. INTRODUCTION
In Spring 2014 Blackstone, the US private equity outfit, made a signal US$1.73bn cash
purchase—the entirety of a Las Vegas casino—from Deutsche Bank.1 Some at the time remarked that
the fact that Deutsche held a casino at all was indicative of the excesses that led to the Global Financial
Crisis (the ‘GFC’) and that the sale amounted to a shedding of the past. The empowerment of
supervisors to pursue a financial stability objective by closely monitoring systemically important
financial institutions, and in particular the global banks, had had the desired effect: these banks were
divesting themselves of risky assets as part of a general process of strengthening balance sheets against
future shocks. Yet is this somewhat to miss the significance of this transaction? Should we not be more
concerned with the transferee of the casino rather than the transferor?
What if the significance of this transaction is that it is symptomatic of a general indirect transfer
of credit risk from banks and bank SPVs to non-banks, particularly investment funds? Could it be that
a combination of supervisory tightening and banks’ own balance sheet retrenchment has left a vacuum
that is being filled by funds; funds that are subject to levels of regulation inconsistent in scope and
application?
The guiding thread of this article is the consideration of data that suggest potential for a build-up
of systemic risk among alternative investment funds engaged in a particular sub-market of fund activity.
It therefore proceeds as follows. Sections B.1 and B.2 highlight the lessons of the GFC for non-bank
credit providers, particularly funds, and how these lessons did, or did not, feed into the drafting and
implementation of the Alternative Investment Fund Management Directive of 2011 (the ‘AIFMD’).2
Section B.3 then details the post-AIFMD emergence of the market segment studied in this article by
providing an overview of the regulation of both private placements and the non-banks that invest in
what are known as Pan-European Private Placement (‘PEPP’) securities. This must be understood in
the context of the recent supervisory focus on Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs, and
particularly banks (SIBs)) and related infrastructure such as clearing houses.3 Section C then provides
empirical evidence of a build-up of debt outside the core banking system and tests the data against
certain early warning risk indicators deployed by central banks. In particular we show that there is a
significant concentration of PEPP securities in the hands of non-banks, indeed, in the hands of
investment funds. It is argued that this reorientation of the market for debt in this way at least raises
concerns about whether these non-banks may contribute to systemic risk by virtue of operating in the
penumbra of the current supervisory focus. The empirical data is discussed firstly on a descriptive
basis, before more advanced techniques of analysis, trailed in Section B.1, are deployed to the extent
possible. This article considers systemic risk in both the holders of PEPP (Section C.4) and in the
beneficiaries of, i.e. investors in, those holders (Section C.5). Section D explores the regulatory
1 Arno Schuetze and Edward Taylor, ‘Deutsche Bank sells casino to Blackstone for $1.7 billion’ (Reuters, 15 May
2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/15/us-deutsche-bank-casino-idUSBREA4E0LF20140515
accessed 17 April 2015.
2 Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund
Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU)
No 1095/2010, OJ L174/1.
3 Starting in the UK with the ‘Financial Stability Objective’. S.2A(1) Bank of England Act 1998 as amended in
particular by s.238 Banking Act 2009 (‘BoEA’) and s.4(1) Financial Services Act 2012. The BoEA now contains
various provisions empowering the Bank of England through the Financial Policy Committee not just to monitor
systemically important banks and infrastructure, but to recover (through e.g. bail-in) and resolve them to maintain
financial stability. See further P. Tucker and others ‘Macroprudential Policy at the Bank of England’ (September
2013) Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 2013 Q3.
3implications of these conclusions. It argues that the current system of supervision is incomplete and in
parts incoherent and that the proposed Capital Market Union is a significant opportunity to extend,
harmonise and simplify regulatory powers with respect to the growing role of non-bank credit providers.
However, the principal aim of this article is to distribute and analyse the data gathered concerning the
role of alternative investment funds in a relatively new and specialised sub-market of financial activity.
It is this data which is used as the basis for further research into the role of funds as credit intermediators
post-GFC and into non-traditional forms of credit provision.
B. AN OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL STABILITY MEASURES AND THE
TREATMENT OF NON-BANK CREDIT PROVIDERS
1. Non-Bank Credit Providers—Lessons from the GFC
In providing other forms of credit intermediation than that offered by banks, alternative
investment funds (‘AIFs’)4 of all kinds may indeed increase financial stability and reduce systemic risk,
if only because the diversification of risk across a wider range of smaller market participants means that
individual insolvencies may be borne by the market as a whole. This must be seen in the context both
of rapid growth in the AIF and particularly hedge fund sector from the beginning of the twenty-first
century,5 and the belief among regulators that risk absorption by AIFs indeed reduced systemic risk
during the 2002-2003 downturn.6 Thus the conventional wisdom among regulators during the early
stages drafting of the AIFMD was that AIFs posed no meaningful risk to financial stability; any
problems would be corrected by the market itself.7 However, during the GFC it became clear that the
transfer of credit risk to AIFs can contribute to financial instability.
The research on AIFs and risk may to some extent by categorised according to the three ‘Cs’ of
financial instability: connectivity, concentration, and contagion. I draw on the methodologies first
advanced by King and others8 and Hendricks and others,9 and adopted by Oet and others,10 for assessing
these structural risks in Section C. Here I will provide a qualitative discussion of the three Cs—
connectivity, contagion, and concentration—as a basis for analysis of AIFs and risk during the GFC.
Connectivity refers to the structural conditions necessary for channelling financial contagion.11
Close contractual links between market participants form a key systemic linkage, and as Andersen
4 As defined in the AIFMD. AIFs include qualifying hedge funds, private equity funds, listed closed-end funds,
real estate funds, infrastructure funds, commodity funds, other non-UCITS retail funds, and any ‘feeder funds’,
marketed in the EU.
5 Committee on the Global Financial System, ‘Credit risk transfer statistics’ (2008) BIS Papers No.35.
6 Cf. UK FSA ‘Cross-Sector Risk Transfer’ (May 2002) FSA Newsletter 11.2002; IMF, ‘How effectively is the
Market for Credit Risk Transfer Vehicles Functioning?’ (March 2002) Global Financial Stability Report 36.
7 Cf. Daniel Mugge, ‘From Pragmatism to Dogmatism: European Governance, Policy Paradigms and Financial
Meltdown’ (2011) 16(2) New Political Economy 185.
8 King and others (2006) ‘Are the causes of bank distress changing? Can researchers keep up?’ (2006) 88(1)
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 57.
9 Hendricks et al. (2007) ‘Systemic risk and the financial system’ 13(2) Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Economic Policy Review 65.
10 Mikhail Oet and others. ‘Systemic Early Warning System: A Micro-Macro Prudential Synthesis’ in Jean-Pierre
Fouque and Joseph Langsam (eds) Handbook on Systemic Risk (CUP, 2013).
11 Cf. Basel Committee for Banking Stability, ‘Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks
and banking systems’ (June 2010), 1.
4writes,12 connectivity can be particularly problematic where the connections are formed beyond the
gaze of regulators, for example where originators and creditors of credit deals form a close economic
relationship even though they do not contract with each other (rather severally with the debtor and at
different stages of origination). When looking at AIFs during the GFC, we can see multiple sites of
connectivity. For example, AIFs take credit risk transfers from traditional creditors such as banks. AIFs
which offtake credit risk originated by SIBs may pose a problem if (i) the taking of the risk is
incomplete, e.g. the SIB or an insurer continues to guarantee the risk; (ii) SIBs rely on AIFs as a channel
for taking risk originated by SIBs; or (iii) AIFs provide credit support for deal structures or other AIFs
involved in them. I call this a direct risk transfer. However, it seems appropriate also to hypothesise
indirect risk transfers. Indirect risk transfers occur when SIBs’ credit supply contracts while demand
from debtors remains constant. In equilibrium this demand is met by non-SIBs seeking yield, especially
in today’s loose monetary conditions. Funds, and particularly private equity funds, being already in the
business of providing capital as equity or debt need not move too far to expand the range of their credit
providing activities to meet this demand. We shall see when applying specific connectivity measures
that even this indirect form of credit risk transfer presents connectivity risks to stability. This is due
now not to the ‘vertical’ direct connection of individual funds to SIBs, but the horizontal herd-like
movement of funds to take on new credit risk.
If connectivity measures the direct and indirect interrelatedness of market participants, contagion
measures the ability of participants to withstand shocks emanating from those connected parties. One
variable indicating contagion risk is liquidity in that we may assess the ability of FI2 to absorb losses of
FI1 rather than suffer a shock such that FI3 suffers loss. Oet et al. describe contagion as a measure of
‘financial immunity’.13 It may also be considered qualitative connectedness, perhaps best exemplified
by maturity mismatches between short-term borrowings by AIFs, from both SIBs but also investors, to
fund long-term investments of capital.14
In the context of AIFs, Johnston has noted15 the commonality of position between the EU
Commission, the then FSA, and the Joint Forum (of BCBS, IOSCO, and IAIS), on the contagion risks
inherent in AIFs’ funding.16 ‘Market channel’ funding occurs when AIFs seek leverage to fund
positions. In a rising market more leverage is required as asset prices are bid up, with risk assessments
becoming looser and appetite for risk growing, simply because the last round of funding was repaid
without trouble given rising asset prices. Additionally cost of funds may fall on the same basis of risk
appetite growth. This generates the potential for a feedback loop as described by Brunnermeier and
others17 of ever increasing leverage bidding up assets until a moment of crisis occurs and AIFs seek to
12 Jens Andersen, ‘Risk transfer mechanisms: converging insurance, credit and capital markets’ (2002) 2 OECD:
Financial Market Trends 151 at 171.
13 Oet and others (n 10) 831.
14 Cf. Hubertus Ennis and Todd Keister, ‘Bank runs and institutions: the perils of invention’ (2009) 99 Am. Econ.
Rev. 1588, 1590.
15 Andrew Johnston, ‘Regulating Hedge Funds for Systemic Stability: The EU’s Approach’ (2015) 21(6) European
Law Journal 758, 766.
16 Cf. in particular Annex VI, 64 of the ‘Impact Assessment, Commission Staff Working Document
Accompanying the Proposal for an AIFMD’ Brussels, 30/4/2009, SEC (2009) 576
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/docs/alternative_investments/ accessed 1/11/16, referenced in
Johnston (n 15) above.
17 Markus Brunnermeier and others, ‘The fundamental principles of financial regulation: Geneva Reports on the
World Economy’ (Centre for Economic Policy Research 2009) 11-22.
5reduce their positions and to deleverage.18 At this moment a fire-sale can occur as AIFs seek liquidity
to (a) repay margin from banks and brokers, and these latter begin to write off the unpaid debts; and (b)
repay fund investors, who, seeing fund asset prices fall, withdraw their capital. A run may occur on the
AIF, also spreading to margin providers, feeder funds, funds of funds, and institutional and retail
investors. Thus existing connectivity provides the means of transmission of financial contagion.
Concentration in this market is more debatable, founded as it is on a qualitative judgement of
market boundary and participant individuation. It seems self-evident that concentration in the sense of
oligopoly is inappropriate given the hundreds of AIFs participating. But I claim we may also speak of
weak concentration or sectoral concentration. Weak concentration occurs where a class of market
participants defined for example by a regulatory boundary (in Goodhart’s sense)19 may be said to behave
in some respects as if they were one participant. This need not be behaviour initiated by the participants;
in fact one is more likely to see the class being treated as one by counterparties. By way of example,
Bengtssen20 provides evidence of a scenario where though only a subset of AIFs were actually exposed
to constant net asset value instruments, due to lack of clarity about the assets under management
investors had no way of distinguishing which funds were so exposed and so exited all money market
funds indiscriminately. These movements, Bengtssen argues,21 were likely reinforced by first mover
incentives as documented by McCabe in his examination22 of money market funds. Thus we can
understand why the AIFMD explicitly recognises that aggregate behaviour of funds, however small,
may induce systemic risk:
Although the activities of the AIFMs concerned are unlikely to have individually significant
consequences for financial stability, it is possible that aggregation causes their activities to
give rise to systemic risks. 23
A common theme runs through the qualitative application of these stability indicators to AIFs:
the manner in which AIFs became integrated in wider risky behaviour in a systemically significant
manner. In particular, by means of credit transfers AIFs could take, and do take up risks that had been
borne by SIFIs and so in a sense replaced SIFIs in an at once diversified (many small AIFs) but
‘sectorally’ concentrated (just AIFs) manner. Following the GFC the European Commission sought to
reorient the AIFMD’s draft text to reflect these clear macroprudential issues.
2. Regulation of Alternative Investment Funds Considered
Although a move more closely to regulate AIFs was already under consideration in the run-up to
the GFC, the crisis gave added impetus to reform and pushed the macroprudential perspective to the
fore. The resulting AIFMD is characterised by its focus on capital adequacy in the wider sense adopted
post-GFC i.e. both balance sheet and liquidity adequacy. However, we shall see that it is highly
questionable whether the substance of these provisions pays more than lip service to the key axiom of
the macroprudential perspective: the union of individual rationality does not entail collective rationality.
18 Such behaviour was already identified by Hyman P. Minsky in his gloss on Keynes: John Maynard Keynes
(McGraw Hill 2008), ch.6.
19 ‘The boundary problem in financial regulation’ (October 2008) 206 National Institute Economic Review 48.
20 Elias Bengtssen ‘Shadow Banking and Financial Stability: European Money Market Funds in the Global
Financial Crisis’ (2013) J. of International Money and Finance 579, 584.
21 Ibid.
22 Patrick McCabe ‘The Cross-section of Money Market Fund Risks and Financial Crises’ (2009) Finance and
Economics Discussion Series 2010-51, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
23 AIFMD, recital (17).
6As to balance sheet adequacy there are basic requirements for initial capital24 that may be
enhanced depending on the size of the funds managed25 and how (internally26 or externally27) whether
the AIF is a fund of funds,28 and the organisational risks29 of the AIF in question. Liquidity adequacy
is dealt with by Art.16 AIFMD but as Andenas and Chiu state,30 the requirements are notable for their
open-ended nature in comparison to requirements for banks and indeed the provisions of the original
draft AIFMD put forward by the European Commission. Art.16 leaves it largely to individual AIFMs
to determine their liquidity strategies. As Johnston has shown31 in great detail, this concession was
granted to AIFs following heavy lobbying from the UK and hedge funds, who argued quite plausibly
that AIFs were too diverse a class for legislators even to begin to second guess their investment
strategies. Indeed, hedge funds may be said to specialise in non-standard approaches to investment.
Yet in yielding to this individualist perspective the AIFMD appears markedly to undercut its
macroprudential aims.32 The EU legislature, Zetsche states,33 ended up producing ‘high-level
guidance’, and delegated legislation in some instances was produced by the European Commission
while deliberately ignoring the detailed input of ESMA. The result is the worst of both worlds, a
Procrustean solution for almost all EU funds combined with what Ferran decries34 as heavy-handed
meddling in a confusing set of rules exacting significant costs—‘making a mockery of the very notion
of subsidiarity’.
Principles-based regulation in which managers determine regulatory meaning merely replicates
the limitations of individual rationality. As Allen and Carletti write35 in the context of SIBs, aggressive
liquidity management in times of stress is individually rational, but as this is likely to be in the form of
hoarding cash and cash equivalents such activity reduces liquidity for connected parties. The collective
result is contagion of illiquidity and hence the need for a macroprudential regulator to monitor and act
upon these collective effects. The AIFMD provides for information disclosure to and sharing between
regulators, but without what Johnston, following Minsky, calls36 a ‘bright line’ liquidity requirement
the AIFMD seems to expect regulators to unpick individual strategies. This might be deemed inefficient
regulation.
There remain other significant deficiencies in the regulation of AIFs. Even if we assume
regulators can monitor the leverage of all AIFs on the basis of information disclosed, the AIFMD
disclosure requirements seem geared towards investor protection—the sort of market-led regulatory
24 AIFMD Art.9.
25 An additional 0.02% (but not greater than €10m) of the amount in excess of €250m managed: Art.9(3) AIFMD.
26 €125k, Art.9(2) AIFMD.
27 €300k Art.9(1) AIFMD.
28 Art.9(4) AIFMD.
29 Art.9(7) AIFMD covers professional negligence risks.
30 Mads Andenas & Iris Chiu, The Foundations and Future of Financial Regulation: Governance for
Responsibility, (Routledge 2013).
31 Johnston (n 15) 768-771.
32 AIFMD Recital (49).
33 Dirk Zetzsche, ‘Introduction: Overview, Regulatory History and Technique, Transition’ in Dirk Zetsche (ed)
The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive: European Regulation of Alternative Investment Funds
(Wolters Kluwer 2012) 8.
34 Eilis Ferran, ‘After the crisis: the regulation of hedge funds and private equity in the EU’ (2011) 12(3) European
Business Organisation Law Review 379, 398.
35 Franklin Allen and Elena Carletti, ‘The role of liquidity in financial crises’ in Maintaining Stability in a
Changing Financial System (Jackson Hole Conference Proceedings: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 2008).
36 Johnston (n 15) 777.
7theory which characterised pre-GFC thinking. Swapping the aggregate opinions of one class of market
participants (AIFMs) for another (investors) merely replicates macroprudential blindness.
Finally, while specific EU-based AIFs and AIFMs may benefit from passporting across EU states
by virtue of the AIFMD, non-EU funds—particularly from the US—must comply with each national
regime.37 The AIF sector has thus reported38 to ESMA that this leads to confusion, inconsistencies and
conflict for US AIFMs, and we can also assume comparison problems for regulators. This issue is not
obscure—it creates a regulatory boundary which may cause a flow of credit provision business out of
the sphere of AIFMD-covered entities to those from outside the EU which will not be subject to what
general oversight may said to be applicable to qualifying AIFs.
If we may characterise the issues bedevilling the AIFMD, they are the diversity of regulatory
‘special cases’ and so the in-built lack of transparency for macroprudential regulators. Collective
stability has, ironically, been sacrificed to individual interests. As we shall now see, this is particularly
the case when we consider the instruments which are the objects of study of this article: PEPP securities.
3. AIFMD and Pan-European Private Placement
PEPP is an exemplary case of how the existing oversight regime ends up overlooking
macroprudential risks due to the structural problems of the AIFMD itself and indeed the incoherence of
this directive with other regulatory measures such as MiFID. But what is PEPP? In short, Pan-European
Private Placement is best understood as a standardisation of corporate debt financing through private
placement. Private placement has traditionally stood for the issue of (equity or) debt securities to a
limited number of connected/knowledgeable investors, such as private equity houses, who are best able
to assess and undertake risk in immature businesses. Private placements have a back-history in the
United States Securities Act of 1933 and SEC Rule 4(a)(2) Private Placement market (and to a lesser
degree in the German Schuldschein market)39 and in these earlier guises private placement meant what
it meant for share issues, namely a relatively small transaction in which a closed set of purchasers had
been lined up off-market to acquire the notes. As we shall see, however, this closed set has disappeared
to a degree and ‘private’ now more properly refers to the fact that the notes are not listed on any
regulated investment exchange (participations are not listed in any event) and so no prospectus is
required.
By way of further detail, up to 2008 the principal sources of non-trade-related debt finance for a
midcap corporate—public companies having a market capitalisation40 of between GBP500m and
GBP4bn—would seem to be (i) bond issuance, which was corporate-led (with investment bank advice
and underwriting), and (ii) contracting for a syndicated credit facility agreement or ‘CFA’ (which was
very much bank led).41 Focusing on the classic syndicated CFA, the structure was generally this: one
37 ESMA, ‘ESMA’s technical advice to the European Commission on the information that competent authorities
should provide to ESMA pursuant to Article 67(3) of the AIFMD’ 26 March 2014, ESMA/2014/312
http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2014-esma-312_-_l2_advice_to_com_article_675_aifmd.pdf accessed
13 March 2015.
38 Letter of the Managed Funds Association to ESMA dated 8 January 2015 https://www.managedfunds.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/01/MFA-Letter-on-ESMA-AIFMD-private-placement-and-passport.pdf accessed 13
March 2015.
39 Schuldscheinen are private debt securities issued by German Mittelstand corporations to a traditional set of state
banks and insurers. The market is historically specific to German corporate financing.
40 Market capitalisation is the aggregate sterling value of all a company’s then publicly traded shares.
41 Cf. Yener Altunbaş, Alper Kara and David Marqués-Ibáñez, ‘Large debt financing: syndicated loans versus 
corporate bonds’ (2009) European Central Bank Working Paper Series No 1028, 6-8.
8or two arranger banks would negotiate a CFA with the corporate. Critically the CFA contained debt
obligations amounting to commitments of banks to fund and liabilities of borrower corporates to repay.
These debt obligations were valuable and could be bought by incoming banks. Accordingly the
arrangers would market the debt obligations under the CFA to a wider set of banks, perhaps reserving
some participation to themselves. The result would be perhaps a CFA between a borrower corporate
(and its group) and a syndicate of banks. The whole arrangement would be mediated by a facility agent
(usually an arranger) and if the liabilities were secured, by a security trustee or agent located in a
creditor-friendly jurisdiction.42 The key point to understand here was that it was relatively clear who
was providing credit to whom, who originated the structure, and on whose regulated balance sheets the
risk of borrower default was sited. Then existing regulation, notably that based on the Basel II capital
adequacy rules, at least permitted supervisors to observe the build-up of types of risk-weighted assets
on a prudentially supervised bank’s balance sheet (provided, as I say, that this syndicated finance
structure was used).
Now enter the post-GFC private placement model. As with a bond issue the issuer unilaterally
declares indebtedness represented in certain notes worth an aggregate sum, and then issues these to
willing noteholders who form a disparate class and are certainly not (at least at present) as identifiable
as the members of a bond syndicate. By way of example, A plc constitutes by deed poll 1,000 £100
fixed rate 2020 notes. A plc then exchanges these notes for cash (not necessarily £100) provided by a
number of investors. A plc pays a certain sum of interest (coupon) each year and must repay the
principal in 2020. However, a private placement does not necessarily have to amount to a placement
of notes, for the corporate might alternatively issue participations i.e. instruments indicating that the
corporate stands in a more traditional bilateral loan relationship to the participant holder. In other
words, the investor agrees to lend a certain sum to A plc, and so participates with other investors in the
overall loan to A plc governed by the private placement documentation, a standard form of which is
provided by the Loan Market Association.43 Given that both notes and participations are forms of debt
finance, this distinction might seem somewhat Scholastic and is indeed subtle. Essentially the CFA in
a private placement provides for a minimum term loan with bullet repayment plus a fixed or floating
interest rate, with a possibility to vary interest periods, and as with other CFAs quite stringent
representations and covenants in favour of lenders. The choice of structure is then driven by the appetite
of fund creditors i.e. whether they invest in fixed income as a rule or in syndicated debt. The private
placement subscription agreement for notes is quite similar to the CFA but is constructed in terms of a
single note issuance with no minimum, the notes bearing a fixed or floating coupon and to be repaid on
a single date. The most significant difference beyond technical structure is that the representations and
covenants are much lighter than the CFA, mirroring general market practice for bonds. The advantage
then for the issuer corporate is that it has greater flexibility in arranging its business affairs, but in terms
of less specific contractual restrictions on its behaviour (for example no restrictions on incurring
financial indebtedness) and less of a burden in terms of disclosure requirements (for example no
quarterly representations as to compliance with detailed financial covenants).
It will be quite justly interjected that the issues of risky leverage identified in section B.2 are less
applicable to the PEPP model of SME funding. The intervener will highlight that the main objects of
the AIFMD were hedge and money market funds who use short term leverage to engage in spot (less
than three day) trades; a frequency which in practice seems to attract spirals of indebtedness as asset
prices rise. PEPP on the other hand relates to private equity-style financing involving placement of
identified fund capital that is then locked-in for the long term. This could give rise to maturity
mismatches where beneficiaries attempt to withdraw funds before the corresponding securities reach
42 Cf. Philip Wood, Comparative Law of Security Interests and Title Finance (Sweet & Maxwell 2007) especially
the outline at 9-15.
43 Available to paid-up members of the LMA.
9term, our critic will argue, but a leveraging risk is not obvious. Unfortunately (over-)leveraging of
PEPP funds is not impossible, and it does occur. Two specific scenarios have come to light.
The first relates to the use of leverage to boost returns and so retain or attract investors. Some private
equity-specialised funds have put in place credit facilities representing a sizeable proportion of the
Assets Under Management to prop up returns in the context of falling yields. Thus the European
Investment Fund report that:
Carlyle GMS Finance, a closed-end fund of USD 1bn structured as a business development
company in the US, and providing senior loans to middle-market companies, has a revolving
credit facility of up to EUR 500m with various lenders. Usually, leverage of loan funds is
between 0 % and 35 % of their assets.44
The second (also noted by the EIF) relates to the desire to attract fund investors. To prevent maturity
mismatches AIFMs may impose ‘gates’ on withdrawals from the AIF, a lock-in which is adverse to
investors seeking liquidity. There is thus a market for funds that do not gate withdrawals, but which
can ‘cover’ the maturity mismatch in some other way. Unsurprisingly this other way is leverage. Here
AIFMs arrange for a cash buffer or credit similar to swingline facilities for securitization to smooth
other the cracks created by unrestricted withdrawals. Again credit risks ceasing to be an insurance and
becoming a necessity without which the AIF would be unable to pays it its debts to withdrawing as
investors as they fall due irrespective of the value of the illiquid Assets Under Management.
This then is PEPP, but how are PEPP and the AIFs that invest through it treated under existing
regulation? We must consider these transactions from two perspectives: (a) the regulation of PEPP
issuance itself; and (b) the regulation of AIFMs that invest in PEPP.
(a) Regulation of PEPP issuance
If we examine at high level a typical PEPP structure originating in London the issuer, a corporate,
will not be regulated in its issuance of bonds to experienced investors. In particular, due to the private
nature of PEPP debt and the sophistication of creditors, the following key regulations do not apply to
PEPP:
(i) the Prospectus Directive, 45 as now implemented in the UK by Part VI FSMA2000 and the FCA
Prospectus Rules (‘PR’)—which for example does not apply because of s.86(1) FSMA2000
and PR1.2.1 exemptions for qualifying investors;46 and
(ii) s.21 FSMA2000 and the Financial Promotions Order 200547 (the ‘FPO’), which likewise does
not apply by virtue of the reg.50-51 FPO safe harbours for sophisticated investors.
44 Helmut Kraemer-Eis, ‘Institutional non-bank lending and the role of Debt Funds‘ (2014) European Investment
Fund working Paper 2014/25 http://www.eif.org/news_centre/publications/eif_wp_25.pdf accessed 27 April
2016.
45 Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the prospectus to
be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC,
OJ L345, 31/12/2003, as amended by Directive 2008/11/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
March 2008 amending Directive 2003/71/EC on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the
public or admitted to trading, as regards the implementing powers conferred on the Commission, OJ L76,
19/3/2008.
46 As defined in s.86(7) with reference inter alia to an entity falling within Article 2.1(e)(i), (ii) or (iii) of the
Prospectus Directive.
47 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005, SI 2005/1529. Cf. also the
FCA’s Perimeter Guidance Manual PERG 8.11 ‘Types of exemption under the Financial Promotion Order’.
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With only primary rules remaining (e.g. torts of negligent misstatement48) Beat Speck and Joseph
Tenaga,49 commenting comparatively on UK equity private placement regulation are drawn to conclude
that:
In order to avoid (most of) the existing rules and regulations governing the public offer of
securities to the public in the United Kingdom, an unlisted issue may be structured as a
private placement by ensuring that no offering to the public is made according to the
European Prospectus Directive.50
This applies a fortiori to private placement of debt and is part of a wider issue within the
regulation of finance law: that non-capital markets debt is generally tradable on an effectively
unregulated basis under the assumption that it is traded between sophisticated investors—an assumption
of individual responsibility and skill which cannot be considered a sufficient bar to macroeconomic,
that is systemic, crisis.
(b) Outline of regulation of AIFM decisions to invest in PEPP
Firstly, while PEPP is subject to light regulation, AIFMs must fund their acquisition of PEPP by
seeking capital from fund investors. The means by which AIFs fund their acquisition of PEPP securities
is through issuance of ‘financial instruments’ to investors within the meaning of MiFID.51 AIFMs
engaging in relevant activities for AIFs (e.g. raising the capital to be invested, market making, or
marketing) will be caught by the AIFMD. This leads to a mediate, semi-regulated status in which (i)
retail investors would not be able directly to buy PEPP securities for want of sophistication, but can do
so indirectly through funds; and (ii) regulatory oversight only directly targets the AIF-investor
connection.
Secondly, for funds caught by the AIFMD, the defining regulatory cost advantage of PEPP—that
it is private and so less regulated that publicly issued bonds—is negated by parallel regulatory
requirements under AIFMD.
Thirdly, many alternative investment funds are not qualifying AIFs for the purposes of AIFMD,
particularly: (i) non-EU funds managed by outside of the EU;52 and (ii) AIFs falling below the de
minimis thresholds for AIFMD.53 For example, research by the EVCA54 shows that total EU private
48 For further detail, see Charles Hewetson and Nicholas Elliot, Banking Litigation (Sweet & Maxwell 2011), ch.5
for the application of such principles to the sale of syndicated debt.
49 ‘Private Equity Placements: Comparing the Laws in Switzerland, the European Union, the United Kingdom
and the United States: Part II’ [2008] JIBLR 252.
50 Ibid 256.
51 Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial
instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, OJ L145, 30/04/2004 P.0001-0044,
Art.1(17) and Annex I(C).
52 AIFMD Art.2(1).
53 AIFMD Art.3(2)(b).
54 EVCA, ‘Response to the European Green paper on Building a Capital Markets Union’ COM/2015/063 final
http://www.investeurope.eu/media/388552/EVCA-PAE-Response-to-Capital-Markets-Union-Green-Paper.pdf
accessed 19 February 2016, 11.
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equity fundraising in 2014 drew 45.3% of its value from without the EU. Furthermore, 78% of
institutional investors claimed they selected more than half of fund managers from outside Europe.55
Fourthly AIFMs with Assets under Management of less than €500m are exempt from AIFMD
but may be subject to the Venture Capital Funds Regulation (‘VCFR’).56 This would be highly relevant
for those funds specialising in long-term private equity-style investments, yet while AIFMD and VCFR
dovetail neatly in application, reality does not. Funds subject to VCFR must also be ‘unleveraged’57
and lock in capital by barring redemptions for at least five years from initial investment.58 Furthermore,
the fund must be a ‘qualifying venture capital fund’ such that inter alia it invests in ‘qualifying
investments’. The problem is that while ‘qualifying investments’ covers a number of equity
instruments, it only covers a small subset of debt instruments granted to undertakings in which the fund
has already invested and even then this debt must only constitute up to 30% of the invested capital.59
This clearly mirrors long-term private equity investment strategies in start-ups; it does not catch the
more mature, arm’s-length rounds of investment in which PEPP plays a part.
These deficiencies do not exclude specific microprudential and conduct of business regulation of
actors in the PEPP market, nor indeed the post-GFC macroprudential oversight powers. In the UK the
Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England pursues the newly affirmed ‘Financial Stability
Objective’60 which is sufficiently widely drawn as to encircle any financial matter which might generate
systemic risk. Moving out one circle the European System of Financial Supervisors is led by the
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which coordinates with the European Central Bank and
national central banks the specific supervisory remits of the European Banking Authority (EBA), the
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), and the European Securities
Markets Authority (ESMA). The ESRB has its own macro-prudential oversight objective, set out in
Art.3 of its establishing Regulation.61 The nature of these general objectives is somewhat absolute,
however, and all absolute power is essentially empty—content must be provided for the power to act in
a regulated manner. Hence the specific agency powers contained in the AIFMD that ought to regulate
the field in question: funds. What we find, however, is that there is an ill-fitting patchwork of applicable
regulation with loopholes and conflicts. There is no PEPP-focused regulation unless we include the
self-regulatory effects of the Loan Market Association’s and International Capital Market Association’s
standard setting through contract standardisation and guidance respectively.
Given the incoherence of the AIFMD and the limited regulation of PEPP itself, the potential for
regulatory arbitrage in the PEPP market is thus apparent: non-EU sited and managed funds capable of
raising capital outside of the EU may engage in PEPP transactions into the EU without worrying about
AIFMD, and so may have a regulatory cost advantage over EU-based or marketed funds (unless home
55 Ibid.
56 Regulation (EU) No 345/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2013 on European
venture capital funds, OJ L115/1, Art.1(a).
57 Undefined, but leveraged is widely defined as ‘any method by which the AIFM increases the exposure of an
AIF it manages whether through borrowing of cash or securities, or leverage embedded in derivative positions or
by any other means’. The advice to the AIFM, as in so many areas of the AIFMD, must be to assume the worst:
that the fund is within scope.
58 Art.3(2)(b) AIFMD.
59 VCFR Art.3, particularly (b) and (e).
60 S.2A(1) Bank of England Act 1998 as amended in particular by s.238 Banking Act 2009 and s.4(1) Financial
Services Act 2012.
61 Regulation (EU) No.1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on
European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk
Board, OJ L331/1.
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regulation is more stringent). And so the empirical questions of this article are fully posed: can we find
evidence of a shift to funding by PEPP, indicated by relatively bigger growth in this market, and who
indeed are the providers of PEPP funding? If it be shown that there is growth and that a significant
proportion of funds operate from without the EU, benefitting from arbitrage of the current inconsistent
EU-regulatory regime, then we will be in a position to argue that any future Capital Markets Union
(‘CMU’) ought strongly to consider rendering the AIF regulatory regime coherent and clear to enable
effective macroprudential oversight of PEPP at the very least.
C. A CASE STUDY OF CREDIT GROWTH BEYOND GLOBAL-
SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS
The purpose of this paper is not so much to question the a priori sufficiency of the AIFMD,
though these questions are raised, but to examine whether a posteriori the existing regulatory
framework has worked to prevent a repeat of the conditions of instability identified in Section B—the
(in)direct transfer of credit risk from traditional credit providers to AIFs. In other words, has there been
a flow of credit supply business into the AIF sector and should we be worried about this? It is not
possible to establish a causal link between increased restraints on SIBs such that we might say AIFs are
filling the role of SIBs as credit providers, but I submit that it is in itself of interest whether AIFs are
increasing their role as credit providers. This is especially the case if this credit growth exhibits the
three Cs of systemic risk. The question Section C will seek to answer then is whether it is possible to
adduce evidence for such AIF-centred credit growth.
1. Evidence for credit growth in PEPP
(a) Systemic risk typology
As stated above, this article relies on the typology of systemic risk advanced by Mikhail Oet and
others,62 which itself combines several precedents in financial stability modelling. Oet’s team draw
together a number of intuitive instability variables to model systemic risk,63 in which each variable
contributes to or mitigates local stresses within a given system. Oet’s team notes, however, that were
these factors quantitatively determinative then the market would already know where risk is building
up, something about which markets are inherently uncertain in the Keynesian sense of this term. Yet it
remains possible for observers64 to make qualitative judgements based on quantitative indicators, and
this is what is proposed in this article: to highlight areas of indirect credit transfer, qualitatively assess
systemic risks, and query the limits of existing regulatory oversight.
(b) Methodology
The data concerning PEPP was collated in two stages on 10 March 2015 (the first reference date
or ‘1RD’) and 28 January 2016 (the second reference date or ‘2RD’) and all data stated to be my own
are drawn from this one dataset, crosschecking with available data from Private Placement Monitor.
The data were sourced from a standard Bloomberg terminal and are not compared with data sourced
from Bloomberg’s chief competitor ThomsonReuters Datastream. The principal reason for this is that
Datastream does not provide the granularity required to isolate PEPP issuance amongst fixed income,
62 Oet (n 10).
63 Ibid 794.
64 See for example Robert J. Shiller, ‘How a bubble stayed under the radar’ New York Times (New York, 2 March
2008).
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and furthermore only seems to cover rather arbitrary forms of private placement.65 As to Bloomberg,
within a fixed income66 search I filtered for Western European67 incorporated entities and for own
currency68 private placement issuance to date, resulting in data for private placement issuance worth
€185.9bn from 1 January 1991 to 31 December 2015. This sample is not further reduced by the
exclusion of outliers. The data are thus focused on the discrete variation of issuance by value (EUR)
over the time period studied, and provide neither individual business-level information nor account for
multiple issuance by individual corporates. The data gathered on 2RD were significantly enhanced by
Bloomberg’s introduction of a ‘Private Placement’ filter for Market Type that extended results beyond
those obtained on 1RD following a manual search for self-identifying PEPP to all debt issues meeting
the Transaction Criteria. These micro-data were then filtered separately by (i) country of incorporation;
(ii) currency; (iii) holder; and (iv) issuer, and ranked by value or date as required.
(c) The evidence
If we look at Figure 1, over the quarters from Q1 2009 we see a definite trend of growth in the
market. It should be noted, though it is not shown in Figure 1 for clarity, that in the quarters between
1991 and 2009 private placement issuance grew from <€1m per annum, slowly at first then from 2004
rapidly to a peak of €100m in 2006 before dropping to a local minimum of €38m at the start of the GFC
in 2008. We provide this longer term data in Table 1 below:
Table 1: PEPP 1991 to 2008 Inclusive, EURm Issued
1991-
1995
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
2 6 16 8 9 23 17 14 27 16 64 100 78 38
Figure 1: PEPP 2009 to date by quarter69
65 As at May 2016, Datastream provided external links to private placement data in the US and Australia, and data
from its own sources almost entirely from South Korean private placement market. Consequently there simply
are no comparable data from this source.
66 A standard synonym for ‘bonds’ and similar debt capital.
67 As defined by Bloomberg’s ‘Countries & Regions’ tool.
68 This condition excluded Western European incorporated entities issuing dollar denominated notes and so
excluded the US market. It did however also exclude issuances by, say, a French corporation in sterling. There
was no time-efficient way to refine this condition for all results.
69 Source: Bloomberg and own calculations. Figures compiled 1RD and 2RD.
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All the major jurisdictions see expansion, with notable growth in Great Britain, the Netherlands
and perhaps unsurprisingly Luxembourg, which is known for its beneficial tax regime for capital raising
holding companies (SOPARFIs70). More specifically, for the five year period from the depths of the
GFC to the year ending 2014, we see a striking 171.5% year-on-year growth rate in PEPP securities
issuance by amount.71 The same fixed income search was conducted, this time widening the data to
capture all corporate bond issues for Western European issuers and currency in the period. The same
growth calculation indicated that year-on-year growth for all bond issuance (PEPP inclusive) over the
period was 33%.72 Even taking into account the drop in issuance in 2015, at 2RD the effective growth
rate is still 123%.73
70 Sociétés de participations financières.
71 Using the standard discrete growth rate formula as follows: letting f be the value at the end of the period, s be
the value at the end of the first year of the period, and y be the number of years -1 (i.e. ignoring the first year as
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This indicates a marked difference in performance of PEPP over all bond issuance by value. The
data concerning ‘traditional’ bond issues should however be caveated with consideration of whether the
new issues are balancing redemptions of existing bonds, something which only begins to affect PEPP
as this market matures. It turns out that while all bond issues have seen growth, this growth has not
matched the growth in redemptions as corporates have sought to deleverage. European Central Bank
data for the same period for gross public (i.e. listed) non-share securities issuance for the Eurozone
indicates an average year-on-year decline in issuance of c.5.6% as a function of nominal value.74 The
ECB data does show quite dramatic swings in issuance during this period, but the general trend is lower.
This dataset however does not distinguish between financial institution and corporate issuance. The
nearest comparable Bank of England data only begins in Q1 2013 but does distinguish non-financial
institutions.75 For the last two years of our reference period to 1RD (2013-2014 inclusive) we also see
a year-on-year decline in UK resident non-financial institution bond issuance of approximately 28% I
think we may only take the coarsest conclusions from all this—that PEPP growth, at 123% year-on-
year, is qualitatively marked.
The question naturally arises: taking a snapshot at 1RD, PEPP constitutes what proportion of
total fixed income issuance?76 The straightforward calculation informs us that at 1RD PEPP constituted
3.73% of total Western European fixed income issuance. This is a not insignificant proportion
compared to other specialist forms of debt security known to have played a role in the GFC. For
example, take the infamous Collateralised Debt Obligation (‘CDO’).77 The Securities Industry and
Financial Markets Association has calculated that all asset backed securities (of which CDOs form an
unspecified subset) constituted just 4.4 % of all ‘bonds’ issued in 2006 in the US i.e. during the peak
prior to the GFC.78
2. Comparison with wider movements in fixed income markets
I now compare the PEPP issuance to fixed income securities issuance over time for Western
Europe. This research was initiated in late 2013 in light of information that PEPP was growing
considerably, and the 1RD dataset represents the fruits of that research. The 2RD dataset collected for
the purposes of updating this article for publication indicate a falling back in PEPP issuance growth in
the last 12 months. This data is displayed in Figure 2 below; the right hand axis indicates the PEPP
amounts issued.
74 European Central Bank, ‘Securities Issues Statistics: net issues calculated as the difference between gross
issues and redemptions. (debt securities, only)’ http://www.ecb.int/stats/money/securities/html/index.en.html
accessed 10 June 2015.
75 Bank of England, ‘E3.1 Capital issuance by UK residents’ (Bankstats: Monetary & Financial Statistics,
December 2014) http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/bankstats/2014/dec.aspx accessed 10 July
2015.
76 We cannot compare redemptions at this stage for the reasons discussed above.
77 For reportage on the CDO’s role in the GFC see John Bellamy and Fred Magdoff, The Great Financial Crisis—
causes and consequences, (Monthly Review Press 2009), especially 94-95, 97.
78 SIFMA, ‘US Bond Market Issuance and Outstanding - annual, quarterly, or monthly issuance to January 2016
(issuance) and from 1980 to 2015 Q3 (outstanding), Updated 02/03/16’,
http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx/ accessed 22 February 2016.
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As can be seen from Figure 2, PEPP has grown from minimal issuance in three broad stages.
From 2009 to Q2 2013 PEPP growth mirrored the general fixed income trend quite closely, then
between Q3 and Q4 2013 PEPP issuance rocketed—the growth that initiated this research. Since Q1
2014 however PEPP issuance has fluctuated widely. Rather than mirroring fixed income, PEPP now
moves almost inversely to fixed income issuance, suggesting perhaps that other things being equal
PEPP and other fixed income instruments have become substitutes for each other.79 The reasons for
fluctuations are not apparent but on a benign interpretation may result from: (i) bigger single issuances
as the market has matured, that dominate the market; and (ii) issuers actively timing issuance so as not
to compete for capital during times when classic corporate bonds are issued. A less benign
interpretation will be considered in Section D.
3. The holders of PEPP—drawing broader conclusions from the data
Although the focus of the data has been credit growth in private placement issuance, we can use
the same data to shift that focus to a wider problematic, namely the identity of those involved in non-
traditional forms of credit such as private placement. Accordingly, we now consider not the instrument









































































































































































































(PEPP) as systemically risky per se, but link it to a build-up of that instrument within a non-traditional
sector of credit provision.
Taking once again the PEPP data we now analyse both the ‘holders’ and ‘beneficiaries’ of these
instruments. A ‘holder’ is defined as the person (i) with legal title to the PEPP securities issued; and
(ii) with responsibility for management of the securities. A ‘beneficiary’ may either share legal
ownership with the holder, or be a beneficiary in the true sense—of a trust on which the securities are
held by the holder as trustee. For example, the classic venture capital fund will be structured as a limited
partnership with the ‘holder’ as general partner and the ‘beneficiaries’ as limited partners. The
terminology is confusing from the legal perspective but generality is required and it accords with the
financial categories adopted in the market and by which the data are organised by the sources.
Figure 3: Amount of PEPP held by fund jurisdiction.
The data are first illustrated by jurisdiction in Figure 3. Figure 4 shows the principal holders of
PEPP i.e. holders of ≥ 1% of the total PEPP issued and outstanding at 2RD. On examination we can
see a significant presence of US-based funds, especially of the private equity type. The general
preponderance of US private equity should not surprise given the maturity of the US market, but the
appearance of such concentrated holdings in non-SIB EU financial houses was not expected. Overall,
as at 2RD, the US accounts for 57.25% of all holdings, the UK for 11.89 %, the Netherlands for 5.44%,
Italy for 4.38 % and Sweden for 3.52%, the remainder being spread across the major financial
jurisdictions of Western Europe. The Cayman Islands (‘KY’) participate in just over 2.58% of PEPP.
Overall, we see that some 66.44% of PEPP by value is held outside of the EU, though we cannot
determine whether nevertheless the holder and/or manager fall within the scope of the AIFMD.
As the headline holdings indicate, the biggest presence among holders is from non-banks (see
Figure 4). Indeed of the holders of >1 % of all PEPP, being 25 financial institutions, only two are
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PEPP. The remaining 20 institutions are funds, holding 55.73 % of all PEPP, being €2.67bn worth of
PEPP securities. It has not been possible to establish whether non-EU based funds qualify as AIFs by
virtue of either being marketed into the EU or being managed by EU-based AIFMs.
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Figure 4 Holders of >1% PEPP issued to 2RD
being approx. €3.2bn of total €4.55bn
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4. Analysis of regulatory concentration and connectivity risk—holders of
PEPP
It is further possible to submit our data on holders and beneficiaries to existing financial
instability indicator methodologies, specifically the methodologies for assessing connectivity,
concentration, and contagion trailed in Section B. Firstly, I focus on concentration, which is perhaps
the most traditional risk factor in terms of individual FI exposure to a specific market, and which may
be determined by a simple market share measurement. As Oet and others note:
An institution’s concentration in a particular market, expressed through the corresponding
market share, is a useful explanatory indicator of structural fragility, since it measures the
relative position of significant institutions in the financial system. … The rationale for
including concentration as an indicator of structural fragility is that, other things being
equal, higher levels of market concentration are increasingly less efficient in absorbing and
diversifying the impact of small shocks on expectations. Thus a higher concentration
indicates increased susceptibility to stress as the result of expectation shocks.80
Some authors apply a version of the Herfindahl-Hischmann Index which measures aggregate
exposures and so amounts to a concentration risk index for the entire system.81 However, HHI relies
on a troublingly subjective judgement of the relevant market and so is not used here. The simpler
market share analysis is clear ‘on the face’ of the statistical data. Of the 552 securities issued to 2RD,
we find the biggest holders to be US outfit T. Rowe Price Group, Inc. (11.52 % of total, being €565.7m)
and British company Jupiter Investment Group Management Ltd. (‘Jupiter’: 9.66% of total, being
€466.3m). The ‘Others’ accounting for 29.53% of the PEPP holders are 135 FIs holding each no more
than 0.92% of the total PEPP. To emphasise these findings:
(i) Approximately 20% of the value of PEPP is concentrated in the hands of just two AIFS
(ii) Approximately 70% of the value of PEPP is concentrated in the hands of just 23 financial
institutions, being:
a. 18 AIFs;
b. three insurers; and
c. two banks.
(ii) The market share of the two leading PEPP AIFs as a proportion of the 23 biggest PEPP
holders is approximately 30%.
By way of analogy, in their analysis of the asset management industry and financial stability, the
United States Treasury’s Office for Financial Research expressed concern that:
The top 25 mutual fund complexes managed 74 percent ($9.9 trillion) of U.S. mutual fund
assets, including 74 percent ($4.3 trillion) of equity funds and 75 percent ($2.5 trillion) of
fixed-income funds. Ten firms each have more than $1 trillion in global assets under
management (AUM), including nine U.S.-based managers, as concentration in the sector
has increased…. Higher concentrations could increase the market impact of firm-level risks,
such as operational risk and investment risk, or increase the risk of fire sales.82
80 Oet (n 10) 837.
81 HHI is used by Oet (n 10), but is already deployed as one indicator of concentration-related financial instability
by the New York Federal Reserve (Cetorelli and others, ‘Trends in Financial Market Concentration and Their
Implications for Market Stability’ (March 2007) FRBNY Economic Policy Review 33).
82 Office for Financial Research, ‘Asset Management and Financial Stability’ (Office for Financial Research, US
Dept. of the Treasury 2013) 3.
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Using the Office for Financial Research’s data,83 it is straightforward to determine that the
leading three asset managers (Worldwide Assets Under Management > USD2,000bn) have a market
share of 31.75% of the assets managed by the top 20 asset managers. This amounts to 23.5% of all such
managed assets. If such concentrations suggest significant risks in the asset management industry in
general, I claim that the figures for PEPP given above suggest a significant concentration risk in the
market for PEPP securities and that this risk is concentrated in the hands of AIFs.
Following several financial instability models, concentration is considered in tandem with
connectivity. One measure of connectivity—CoVaR (‘Conditional Value at Risk’)—proceeds by
generalising the quantile losses FI i would make in, say, the 5% tail or extreme cases of such losses (the
Value at Risk, or VaR). VaR for a representative set of FI’s is established and regressed to produce the
system S’s VaR. We then calculate the contribution to S’s VaR from each i, j,… in S. This is the CoVaR,
being simply the difference between the VaR of S when (a) j is itself in distress (returns in the 5 %
extremum) and (b) j’s returns are median. Critically, this loss estimation covers both direct loss (e.g.
where a given i invests in or through j) and indirect loss (e.g. where j’s loss leads to a movement in the
value of PEPP securities affecting i’s balance sheet).
The problem in applying CoVaR to our data is that to make plausible predictions it relies on
historical market data. The PEPP market, which is quantitatively and qualitatively ‘new’, lacks
representative data of loss and thus such an analysis may be less than plausible.84 Yet the motivation
for CoVaR is a strong one. As Adrian and Brunnermeier write:
Selling of assets can lead to mark-to-market losses for all market participants who hold a
similar exposure—common exposure effect. Moreover, the increase in volatility might
tighten margins and haircuts forcing other market participants to delever as well (margin
spiral). This can lead to crowded trades which increases the price impact even further.85
In the absence of specific data at this stage, it may be possible to analogise from historical data
across all fund types. Oura and others assessed86 the contribution to systemic risk—defined as the
CoVaR87—of funds according to investment focus: advanced or emerging market, and corporate bonds
or equity. In this broad sweep what we see is that on average distress in funds of bonds always
contributes less to systemic risk than equity funds by a factor of about three. Evidently this only tells
us about a system as defined—here banks, insurers and the top 150 funds worldwide in the given
markets, and it is not at all clear whether PEPP would qualify as a ‘corporate bond’ for this analysis e.g.
if it is limited to exchange-traded securities. Yet even these data support a counterintuitive conclusion,
for Oura and others discover88 that there is little relationship between fund size and risk—what matters
most is investment focus. Smaller funds make a disproportionately bigger contribution to CoVaR than
larger funds. Accordingly they recommend that ‘oversight of the industry should not simply focus on
large funds. My reading of these data is that the obvious direct impact of a large fund collapsing, though
relevant, is not the sole risk, for the indirect impact of smaller funds in distress, and impact primarily
83 Tobias Adrian and Markus Brunnermeier, ‘CoVaR’ (September 2008) Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff
Reports no.348, 5.
84 As to the case of SIBs see inter alia e.g. Adrian and Brunnermeier (n 83); Germán Lopez-Espinoza and others,
‘Asymmetric CoVaR: An application to international banking,’ (Systemic Risk, Basel III, Financial Stability and
Regulation Conference 2011, 1 March 2011) http://ssrn.com/abstract=1773902 accessed 10 February 2016;
85 Oet (n 10) 8.
86 Hiroko Oura and others, ‘The asset management industry and financial stability’, (IMF, April 2015) 116 and
Appendix 2.
87   =≤ 5%.
88 Oura (n 86) 119.
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on falling asset prices, are also important. Zepeda argues89 that by raising regulatory costs to market
entry the AIFMD has actually eaten into smaller AIFs’ profitability and returns such that AIFMs have
been forced to take bigger risks even to compete. This may cause smaller AIFs to congregate around
innovative products ignored by established funds. Oura and others conclude90 that ‘the SIFI discussion
for funds and asset managers should take into account specific risks of products in addition to size’.
Where a particular product, such as PEPP, becomes the ‘symbol’ of a market driven sell-off as CDOs
did, we may well see these indirect, concentrated contributions to systemic risk coming to the fore.
The aspect of indirect connectivity is very important. By virtue of herding behaviour we may
plausibly treat unconnected entities as ‘one’ in terms of attributing losses to all where the same value is
at risk in a given market. The classic herding measure of Lakonishok and others91 does not help us
however because it examines properly herd-like movements in a liquid market i.e. do fund managers
tend to all buy into or sell out of a stock at the same time? PEPP is at least intended to be held to term
so a more static analysis is appropriate, where we determine who has taken the same securities at the
point of issuance. That there may be issuance-based herding by funds in the PEPP market would
correlate with fund behaviours in other established markets. Oura and others have shown that for all
traditional security types (equities and bonds in the US and emerging markets) both institutional and
retail funds displayed markedly increased herding from June 2006 to May 2014.92
What do the PEPP data tell us that suggests static herd connectivity of this kind? The 25 holders
of 1% or more of total PEPP securities together hold 69.4% of such securities. In aggregate they hold
a total of 667 PEPP securities by issuance, but this number makes no allowance for multiple holdings
of the same security. Given that these data for holders at 2RD indicates 399 of the 552 PEPP securities
issued historically are held today, we can minimise this holding ratio to determine that on average each
top 25 institution holds at least one PEPP security that is held by one of the other 25. Looked at another
way, if one institution suffers a significant value at risk loss with respect to one PEPP security and
determines that this is reason to divest itself of both PEPP securities, this immediately affects at least a
second institution in the manner described by Adrian and Brunnermeier.93 This is all the more
significant because of the tailored and potentially illiquid nature of PEPP securities. Exit by one holder
removes the most obvious purchaser from the other holder of that particular security (they have skin in
the game and are familiar with the borrower). In the minimal case of just two holders, the divestment
by one amounts to a significant downward pressure on the value of the PEPP security, leading to the
second holder to consider exiting its position, both with respect to the immediately affected security but
also with respect to the other security it holds, and so on. At some point this chain reaction could
determine general market views of PEPP securities such that all holders consider exiting their position.
The minimal connectivity scenario thus does not indicate less systemic risk, but rather has its own risk
when connected with high concentration—PEPP securities become proportionately more sensitive to
the movements of one institution. In all likelihood the actual intersection of holding is likely to be much
higher, but the lengthy analysis of each security to determine each holder must be undertaken in further
research. I do claim that it is plausible that the combination of this kind of connectivity with the specific
concentrations of this market should give regulators pause for thought.
89 Rodrigo Zepeda ‘To EU, or not to EU: that is the AIFMD question’ (2014) 29(2) JIBLR 82, 95.
90 Ibid.
91 Josef Lakonishok and others ‘The impact of institutional trading on stock prices’ (1992) 31 Journal of Financial
Economics 13.
92 Oura (n 86) 113.
93 Oet (n 10).
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Finally, we are simply not in a position to assess the third structural ‘c’—contagion94—from the
data available. Contagion indicator models tend to focus on the capacity of loss at one institution to
cause capital impairment in up to 30% of the financial system analysed and/or the immunity to such
shock of related institutions. The relevant liquidity data is not available to me (as yet) but even if it
were available, its comparative utility for macroprudential analysis is low. For the reasons cited in
Section B, AIFs are able effectively to determine bespoke liquidity strategies and so render themselves
incomparable. The best that can be achieved is specific assessments for each AIF and cross-market
comparisons appear to be tremendously difficult.
5. Analysis of regulatory concentration and connectivity risk—beneficiaries of
PEPP
I now consider the ‘beneficiaries’ of AIFs which term is used to cover persons who are silent
investors in the AIF, be they limited partners, share or unit holders, or trust beneficiaries proper.
Analysis of this second circle of interested parties is interesting in its own right for systemic risks may
arise here independently due to connectivity, contagion, and concentration. Thus by way of extreme
example all interests may be held by one beneficiary. When this general potential for risk is combined
with the inherent connectivity of beneficiaries with AIFs we can imagine scenarios where risks at the
level of holders filters immediately through to connected beneficiaries, before spreading between
beneficiaries of all kinds by virtue of mutual connection, contagion, and herd-like concentration. But
let us first examine the data to determine which such risks may be indicated.
The market in which 162 beneficiaries of PEPP holdings participate is less concentrated than that
for holders. All but one of the beneficiaries are funds, though 21 funds (being beneficiaries of 6.1% of
the total securities) are ostensibly ‘named’ bank-approved funds. Only one such bank exceeds a
beneficial interest of 1%. There are 8 ‘named’ insurer funds; beneficiaries of 3.5% of the total. With
just one non-fund participant this high concentration of beneficiaries of PEPP is remarkable and as with
PEPP holders indicates herding at issuance of PEPP.
The 25 biggest beneficiaries of PEPP by investment (here≥0.79% interest) together hold 49.93%
of all PEPP securities. This amounts to an aggregate interest in 432 issued securities, confirming once
again that as a minimum each of the top 25 shares an interest in a security in which a second member
of the 25 is also interested. Yet the diversity of PEPP portfolio strategies is remarkable: the largest
beneficiary by interest—Jupiter JGF with 9.66% market share—is interested in 85 different securities,
while the fourth largest—Vanguard HY Corp Fund, with 2.6% total—is interested in only five PEPP
issues. This suggests that we may see differing connectivity risks depending on the market participant,
for a Jupiter exit could affect more market participants, but a Vanguard exit, assuming its interest
intersects with another participant, will exert greater downward pressure on a single PEPP security. To
this analysis we must add the interaction between beneficiaries seeking to exit a fund and the holders
discussed in the previous section who must be in a position to return capital to beneficiaries on exit and
so may well exit their corresponding holdings, driving down prices in the holder market examined
above.
Figure 5: Amount held, by jurisdiction (0=negligible)
94 James Thomson, ‘On systemically important financial institutions and progressive systemic mitigation’ (2009)
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Policy Discussion paper No.47.
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In terms of jurisdiction, 58% of beneficiaries were based in the US, with the Cayman Islands
accounting for the next largest non-Western European source, viz. 3%. One EU jurisdiction hosts
beneficiaries for the majority of PEPP debt held by EU-based beneficiaries. This is Luxembourg, with
20% of PEPP, being 56% of all EU PEPP beneficiaries. Once again as it is not possible to establish
whether specific entities are AIFMD regulated with respect to individual products, I cannot make
definite claims about the percentage of the market which sits outside of AIFMD oversight. It may
indeed be the case that all US beneficiaries deal with AIFMs, while all US holders market to EU-
citizens, and that as such AIFMD captures all PEPP activity, but I find that highly improbable. It seems
plausible that in respect both of holdings and beneficial interests, a significant proportion of all PEPP
debt is being handled outside of the scope of AIFMD, and under other regulatory systems such as that
of the US. Comity of regulators supports the view that we should not be concerned in terms of investor
protection, but our concern is rather oversight of macroprudential developments. Here, the evidence of
growth, the nature of holders and beneficiaries, and qualitative assessments of systemic risk factors,
suggest we should be questioning the overseer’s competences under the existing regulatory regime.
D. REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS: CAPITAL MARKETS UNION AND
PRE-EMPTING THE NEXT CRISIS
As the discussion in Section B suggested, there is now a sizeable body of literature95 examining
the role of AIFs of various kinds in the GFC and critiquing the efficacy of the AIFMD as a response.
95 Aside from the official reports mentioned in this article, cf. e.g. Eilis Ferran, ‘The Regulation of Hedge Funds
and Private Equity: A Case Study in the Development of the EU’s Response to Financial Crisis’, (February 2011)
University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Working Paper No 11/2011, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1762119 accessed
1 February 2016; Stefano Pagliari, ‘Who governs finance? The shifting Public-Private Debate in the Regulation
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In this Section I build on the empirical work of Section C to argue that this literature must now go
further. I suggest that relatively exotic interventions of funds in the worst excesses of the GFC, through
risk transfers in securitizations and MMFs, must be seen in the light of a wider market transfer of credit
risk—by which I mean a transfer of the role of credit provider—to AIFs and funds not within the scope
of AIFMD. I submit that the data from the PEPP market is symptomatic of that wider transfer of credit
risk into a less adequately regulated sector. Furthermore, I claim that a macroprudential focus on SIFIs,
and particularly SIBs, risks overlooking the potential for smaller FIs acting ‘as one’ as part of a ‘local’
crisis in a specific market, which herd behaviour could spill over into the financial system as a whole.
I will now attempt to sketch out the systemic significance of this change
The broad claim, which rests on the data and on specific regulatory and market deficiencies to be
highlighted below, is that as specialised as the PEPP market is, and as comparatively small as some of
its lead participants are, this market and any of its type have financial stability implications. The concept
of CoVaR informs us, I believe correctly, that indirect causation of loss is a significant factor when
considering stability. This widens our focus then to consider not just lynchpin banks in a financial
system whose losses ‘contractually’ hit other actors, but also aggregates of actors who display similar
investment strategies. Here we come up against the qualitative element of the ‘three C’s’: the need to
define the market or financial system to be analysed. Taking the CoVaR of the whole system and an
AIF’s contribution to it is important, but it seems also wise to look at specific markets both in terms of
the type of investor, their strategy, and the instruments invested in. So doing may find a suitable balance
between those who have argued that we should consider Systemically Important Financial Instruments
on a par with SIFIs and infrastructure, and those who argue,96 to turn a phrase, that instruments are not
bad, it’s the people who invest in them. This layered analysis of markets or sectors is directly suggested
by the HHI methodology which borrows from antitrust regulation. Here the justification for a market
definition is somewhat a posteriori—the aim is to prevent abuse and if abuse is found and prevented
then to some extent the definition is justified. Could we not also argue that if a definition of a financial
market leads to a discovery of instability risk, this end justifies the definition proposed? Such a heuristic
approach is in line with the qualitative nature of various Early Warning Systems deployed today.
How might the PEPP market initiate financial instability? The scenario97 that suggests itself with
respect to all funds is the asset price feedback loop combined with the leverage (or margin spiral)
feedback loop, leverage being an applicable concern in the cases discussed in section B.3 above. It
does not matter where a fall in the underlying value of PEPP securities originates—this may be due to
macroeconomic factors such as deflation or currency fluctuations—but once balance sheet assessments
of PEPP securities start to mark down value across the PEPP market, one may find that AIFMs
determine to move out of PEPP securities or at least cease to invest in new issues. This may initiate a
further downgrade of PEPP securities’ value and spark another round of hedging that could become a
loss spiral. This becomes more likely where the market for PEPP-securities is oversaturated. A less
benign reading of the recent inversion of growth in PEPP compared to all fixed income is that in a sense
Gorovvy and Gregory van Inwegen, ‘Hedge Fund Leverage’ (2011) NBER Working Paper 16081,
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16801.pdf accessed 1 February 2016; Patrick McCabe and others ‘The Minimum
Balance at Risk: A Proposal to Mitigate the Systemic Risks Posed by Money Market Funds’ (Federal Reserve
Bank of New York Staff Report No. 5, 2012) 64; Maria Stromqvist, ‘Hedge Funds and Financial Crises’ (2009)
Economic Review of the Sveriges Riksbank 87.
96 Willem Buiter first raised the idea of licensing financial instruments in a manner akin to food and drugs. For a
consideration of views on this proposal cf. Stephen Connelly, ‘Is it Time for a More Concrete Focus on
Systemically Important Financial Instruments?’ (2014) 29(5) Journal of International Banking Regulation 274.
97 For discussions of asset price and margin spirals cf. the oft-cited Brunnermeier, and others (n 17); cf. with
respect to AIFs Johnston (n 15) 780, who applies Hyman Minsky’s analysis speculation-hedge cycles developed
from JM Keynes.
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the PEPP market has peaked and that investors now choose listed corporate bonds over PEPP, only
returning to PEPP when listed corporate bonds perform badly or returns there are poor. Such a reading
implies that any turbulence in PEPP would quickly see a reversion back to classical bond issuance,
leaving AIFs holding illiquid, if still performing assets. Looking back before the inversion, in June
2014 EIOPA shared its risk data with the ESRB and reported (albeit in one sentence) that it was
concerned that illiquid investments such as private placement bonds were making their way into
investment portfolios just as defaults were rising.98 The inversion shown in the data may imply that the
push/pull factors from listed bonds may in fact still be dominating movements into and out of PEPP
rather than PEPP fundamentals.
Now PEPP securities are not as liquid as other typical AIF investments. Indeed even with
standard AIFs investors typically cannot redeem on demand where a ‘run’ occurs because AIFMs retain
‘the right to invoke prohibitive redemption policies (e.g. gates and lock-ups) in the event of significant
investor withdrawals.’99 Nevertheless ‘gates’ of this particular kind are responsive to, not predictive of,
mass withdrawals100 and so a mere recalibration of balance sheets may be enough, especially if
defensive behaviour is reinforced by such capital adequacy requirements as are in force under AIFMD.
This is because we a dealing not just with the PEPP market but also the market for investors in PEPP-
investing AIFs. Recalibration of balance sheets may lead beneficiaries to reassess the wisdom of
AIFMs and to withdraw funds from not just specific AIFs but from the set of AIFs investing in PEPP.
Here again the herd behaviour and concentration of a class of investors plays the key role—it is as if
one larger FI is in trouble. This withdrawal of funds creates a specific problem for PEPP-holding funds
precisely because of any illiquidity: here is a specific liquidity mismatch that resonates with a problem
that as the AIFMD correctly notes bedevils all funds. Where the AIF in question also relies on leverage
to fund PEPP acquisitions (which is understandable in speculative periods) and/or to smooth liquidity
mismatches, AIFs may well feel a leverage squeeze as creditors react to reducing AIF balance sheets
and so cease providing margin and start calling it. This compounds the AIF’s existing liquidity
problems and may well force it not just into fire-sales of PEPP but of other assets. Again it is the
commonality of the herd of AIF-holders and their concentration which exacerbates these effects. As
the downward pressure on asset prices spreads into other market sectors we can begin to speak, in
analogy with Oura and others, of the systemic CoVaR due to the aggregate PEPP-holding market.
I have stressed the leveraged case as the travaux focus on the risks of AIF leverage101—
unsurprising given the deep shadows cast both by Lehman Bros., but also by Long Term Capital
Management a decade before. Yet what would happen in the above scenario if the AIF was not
significantly leveraged? Evidence provided at the time of the AIFMD’s implementation and subsequent
supervisory practice suggests that unleveraged AIFs do not usually pose a significant systemic risk
requiring the highest level quarterly reporting. There are however exceptions, notably where an AIF
(i) has Assets Under Management in excess of €1 billion, and (ii) which does not invest in non-listed
securities and issuers in order to acquire control.102 The reason for this requirement also goes to
concentration and CoVaR risk—the possibility of VaR being breached is not relevant; what is relevant
98 EIOPA ‘EIOPA Risk Dashboard June 2014: Q1 2014 data’ EIOPA-FS-14/057
https://eiopa.europa.eu/Publications/Standards/EIOPA-FS-14-
057_EIOPA_Draft_Risk_Dashboard_June_2014.pdf accessed 16 March 2015.
99 Evidence of Dan Waters (FSA) in House of Lords European Union Committee, Directive on Alternative
Investment Fund Managers (HL 2010 Paper 48-II) para 96.
100 AIFs with universally applicable gates of greater than five years are not regarded as high risk by ESMA, and
need only report annually under its ‘Guidelines on reporting obligations under Articles 3(3)(d) and 24(1), (2) and
(4) of the AIFMD’ ESMA/2014/869EN, 8.
101 As discussed in section 2.2 above.
102 Art.24(1) AIFMD.
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is the systemic effect of significant losses should this purportedly unlikely event occur (tail events being
by definition not impossible).103
The above scenarios of instability will likely be compounded by the following regulatory
deficiencies that render overseeing overlooking:
Problem of invisibility—as discussed in Section B, there remain two issues of invisibility which
suggest regulators are not able to obtain quality data about PEPP. Firstly, it is designed to be private
and so is little covered by regulation at the point of issuance. At best regulators can only indirectly
sense what is happening in PEPP through analysing AIF holdings in detail or conducting broad research
of the kind in this article. Secondly, and perhaps more critically, the sheer number of potentially non-
AIFMD regulated funds involved in the PEPP market means that at best EU regulators are reliant on
information transfers from third countries. This is a marked regulatory advantage to such non-EU funds
not otherwise covered by AIFMD. Such PEPP-market participants are thus at worst invisible to the
current regulatory structure and so invite risk to coalesce around them.
Problem of regulatory opacity104—as likewise discussed above, even for AIFs within the
AIFMD’s scope, the number of special cases and exemptions, combined with autonomy to determine
liquidity strategy, strongly suggests that regulators are being asked to do too much in trying to compare
this market’s participants for macroprudential purposes. The opacity arises from not being able to
adequately identify comparable behaviours and so also best practice. The AIFMD is decidedly pre-
GFC in its theoretical basis, for it relies on market-led microprudential regulation that is blind to, but
generative of, systemic risk. It is thus quite possible not only that regulators may miss risks in the PEPP
market, and in the wider realm of AIFs, but that they may even set requirements which are pro-cyclical
i.e. increase financial instability.
Problem of inconsistent treatment of non-EU funds—finally, but consequent on the foregoing,
the clear and remarked-upon inconsistency of treatment of AIFs and non-AIFMD regulated funds
promotes regulatory arbitrage and so the potential of a flow of capital (specifically credit) away from
oversight intended to ensure financial stability. The regulatory boundary problem may not be soluble,
but regulation drafted so as to encourage flows to key financial markets outside the EU is hardly
desirable.
Spanning the above is the wider appreciation that the effect of regulatory and self-imposed
restrictions on SIBs’ activity is that the direct credit risk transfers pre-GFC have become indirect credit
risk transfers—that non-traditional lenders are perhaps filling a gap in the market for debt left by banks
in retrenchment. The data suggest that PEPP is just one example of new modes of credit provision
beyond the banks which have formed the focus of post-GFC oversight. Although certain supervisors
have begun to remark upon the role of certain fund types (money market and exchange traded funds),
lumping them into ‘shadow-banking’ may actually work to lessen the urgency with which supervisors
should move to regulate this transfer of risk. What if the emerging situation of non-traditional credit
provision is not a dark recess of finance but rather the new normality of credit provision? CMU provides
an opportunity for recalibration of our thinking about systemic risk in light of these developments.
103 Recital (17) AIFMD; ‘Guidelines on reporting obligations under Articles 3(3)(d) and 24(1), (2) and (4) of the
AIFMD’ ESMA/2014/869EN, 8.
104 This problem of opacity has also been confirmed by ECB Governing Board member Vitor Constâncio:
‘Financial stability risks, monetary policy and the need for macro-prudential policy’ Speech by Vitor Constâncio,
Vice-President ECB (Warwick Economics Summit, 13 February 2015)
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2015/html/sp150213.en.html accessed 13 April 2015.
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E. CONCLUSION
In this article I have sought to establish that there has been a significant shift in finance to PEPP
since the GFC, as is apparent from the evidence of PEPP-market growth and qualitative responses by
the financial sector; that this shift discloses a transfer of credit risk to investment funds; and that the
herding of funds around credit provision techniques such as PEPP could pose a systemic threat to
financial stability. At the very least supervisors should not only turn the gaze to this sector, but should
begin developing the legal instruments which set clear rules that permit appropriate comparison
between market participants and do not actively encourage the flow of capital out of the scope of
regulation. Supervision as a mode of governance may make great claims, but a focus on SIBs rather
than credit growth amongst aggregates of smaller players operating at the edges of inconsistent
regulation could lead to overseeing becoming overlooking.
Given the above, by way of conclusion I would suggest the following broader policy
recommendations as a starting point. First, a joint working group comprising the FPC, the FCA, and
representatives of the regulators of two main markets where traditional private placement is mature (US
Securities Exchange Commission and Germany’s BaFin105) should be established to determine existing
practice regarding stability risks in the private placement market. The ESRB should also be involved
as part of coordination with relevant EU bodies—something important in itself given the prospect of
CMU.
Assuming disclosure requirements are extended into PEPP, macro-prudential intervention
powers could be extended over non-banks to (i) provide greater information about nominated under-
regulated markets than for publicly listed instruments such as that for PEPP debt (the cost of information
provision will prove a useful countercyclical measure in a booming market); (ii) lift or modify the
‘sophisticated investors’ regulatory exemptions for nominated classes of securities where markets for
these securities are overheating (thus increasing transparency and also, hopefully, providing disclosures
for subsequent public and private enforcement); and (iii) halt fire-sales of PEPP and similar quasi-
securitized debt thus containing local crises and preventing contagion.
Actual risks to financial stability need to be identified, correctly assessed as to risk—and post-
GFC that means assuming crisis will occur, not believing in perfect markets—and where possible such
risks should be subjected to a legislative framework which provides supervisors with tools to combat
and isolate sector specific instability. As Richard Sharp of the FPC has stated: ‘[i]n my view, the set-
up of macroprudential policy in the UK is right—now it’s about the execution’.106 The execution means
fleshing-out the wide financial stability objective of supervisors to ensure that this very width does not
lead to complacency about the detail.
In the post-GFC period international finance has been reconfigured not only by the supervisory
developments now in place but also through the evolution of new structures of debt finance which call
into question the adequacy of the new supervisory regime. The above recommendations are offered
partly to provide new impetus to supervisory reform to ensure that what was for some the
epistemological shock of the GFC—the appearance of a crisis that had emerged from finance itself as
a mass effect—is not forgotten, at least for a short while longer.
105 Formally in English: the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority.
106 Speech to the London School of Economics, ‘The Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England: an
experiment in macroprudential management—the view of an external member’ (4 June 2014)
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2014/speech733.pdf accessed 18 April 2015,
9.
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